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Abstract 
Ship maintenance has evolved through the years 
incorporating tools and techniques already applied in 
other industrial sectors. The obvious benefits from such 
an application include improved safety, environmental 
protection, asset integrity, minimisation of downtime 
and increased operability. In this paper, a predictive 
maintenance approach is described employing reliability 
and criticality analysis tools. Its application on the 
Diesel Generator (DG) system of a motor cruise ship is 
also presented. Well known tools such as Failure 
Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) using static and dynamic 
gates together with reliability Importance Measures 
(IMs) are applied. The results of this research paper 
include the estimation of the reliability of the main 
system and sub-systems and the identification of their 
critical components as well as suggesting measures in 
order to prevent and/or mitigate the failures of the 
under-performing equipment. 
Keywords 
Maintenance, reliability, criticality, importance 
measures, Diesel Generator system 
Introduction 
While maintenance research and applications are well-
established in many industries, maritime related 
maintenance seems to follow up at a slower pace. 
Applications such as Reliability Centered Maintenance 
(RCM), Risk Based Inspection (RBI), Condition 
Monitoring (CM) of structures and machinery 
equipment together with Computerised Maintenance 
Management Systems (CMMS) which have evolved in 
aviation, defence, manufacturing, nuclear and oil and 
gas industry, lack in implementation to the same extent 
in the maritime sector. It has been observed that only 
recently such methods have gained increasing attention 
from ship owners/operators, engine and equipment 
manufacturers, shipyards and related stakeholders. 
Lately, a number of conferences organised on maritime 
maintenance and condition monitoring applications in 
shipping, denote the increasing interest of the maritime 
community in this field as well. 
 
Having all the above in mind, the present research paper 
discusses the maintenance methods and techniques 
already in use and suggests the implementation of a 
predictive maintenance approach in the shipping 
industry. In the following sections, these are presented 
in more details. More specifically, section two presents 
the maintenance evolution in the shipping industry 
while in section three the suggested approach is 
established and explained. Section four shows its 
application on the Diesel Generator (DG) system of a 
motor cruise ship. The results of the analysis are then 
presented in section five. Finally, the present paper is 
finalised with the concluding remarks in section six. 
Maintenance background 
Initially maintenance tasks were considered more as a 
financial burden and necessary rework rather than an 
approach which can yield important benefits in terms of 
safety, environment and asset integrity. In shipping, 
corrective maintenance measures were initially applied 
(Fig. 1). The International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS) recommendation 74 specifies a set of 
actions in order to carry out corrective maintenance jobs 
(IACS 2001). These commence with the identification 
of the existing failure, establishing the failure cause and 
finally suggest and implement a corrective measure. 
Corrective maintenance was the preferred method to use 
in the early stages of the maintenance history, as well as 
in cases in which specific conditions applied, like the 
lay-up of ships or when spare parts were not available 
on site. 
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Fig 1: Evolution of maintenance practices in shipping 
industry 
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In 1993, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
presented the International Safety Management (ISM) 
code, setting the foundations for a preventive 
maintenance regime (IMO 1993). This was further 
developed by the initiation of Planned Maintenance 
Systems (PMS) with which maintenance jobs were 
described in extent and their implementation was 
recorded. Moreover, Tanker Management Self 
Assessment (TMSA) was introduced in the oil 
transportation market in 2004 including a maintenance 
parameter (OCIMF 2008). In element 4, the best 
practices a ship owner/operator should take in terms of 
reliability and maintenance standards are described by 
identifying the critical components of the vessel as well 
as arranging for the procedures of controlling 
maintenance. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are set 
from level 1 to 4 in order to illustrate the continuous 
improvement in this field. In this respect, a research 
project was also initiated in order to establish standards 
for performance measurements in the shipping industry 
(Marintek 2009). Shipping Performance Indicators 
(SPIs) were developed as an aggregated expression of 
KPIs so as to provide information about overall 
performance of a vessel at particular areas. 
 
Predictive maintenance was a further step ahead, with 
which it was feasible to evaluate the condition of the 
system under investigation. It also addressed the way of 
optimising maintenance intervals, extending the 
replacement period and reducing the use and cost of 
spare parts. Predictive maintenance can be divided into 
three different categories: marine RCM, RBI and CM 
(Fig. 1). Serratella et al (2007) discussed the application 
of RCM regarding the machinery equipment of ships, 
especially in the offshore oil and gas sector. Conachey 
and Montgomery (2003) presented the RCM principles 
in their paper, defining the steps to be followed in order 
to assist in the decision-making process. RBI on the 
other hand is related to the hull structure of ships and 
offshore assets. In a paper by Rouhan et al (2004), the 
RBI method applied in the case of offshore jacket steel 
structures was presented. In the field of offshore 
structures, Ku et al (2005) assessed the structural 
reliability of a Floating Production Unit (FPU) 
combining the use of the finite element method with the 
hazard identification (HAZID) tool as well as by taking 
into account the existing degradation mechanisms like 
corrosion rate and crack propagation. Turan et al (2009) 
also investigated the influence of good maintenance 
practices on the hull structure of ships and their effects 
on the operational cost and earning parameters 
(production, steel replacement and fuel cost together 
with the cargo-carrying and dismantling earning). 
 
In the field of CM, Salva et al (2004) investigated the 
application of infrared scanning inspection for merchant 
vessels and proposed a method for making an inspection 
plan based on thermal imaging. Courtney (2009) also 
discussed about CM implementation regarding the 
machinery of ships including turbochargers, pumps, 
purifiers and compressors among other equipment. In a 
paper by Yamamoto et al (2007) the measuring of the 
fatigue of the hull of the ships was described by using a 
CM system. They applied their method on a 145,000 m3 
LNG ship, using sensors to detect the stresses on the 
structural members. 
 
The above mentioned methods (RCM, RBI and CM) 
can be combined with a Computerised Maintenance 
Management System (CMMS). CMMS is a further 
development of the initial Planned Maintenance System 
(PMS) which was used to record the preventive 
maintenance tasks in a computerised format. Prioletti 
and Tobin (2008) presented a CMMS for the US Navy 
in which the transition from hand-written reports for the 
ship’s hull structure to a Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA) is described. The information is transferred from 
a centralised database to a touch-screen PDA which is 
used by the person performing the inspection of the hull 
structure in order to complete the maintenance report. 
Moreover, Rodseth et al (2007) studied the combination 
of diagnostic evaluation tools with Technical Condition 
Indices (TCI) by developing a system for online 
monitoring of machinery equipment. 
Methodology 
In this section the generic methodology suggested is 
described (Fig. 2). It consists of data originating from 
the hull, machinery as well as rotating equipment and 
various other systems onboard the ship. Further on, 
several well established analysis tools used such as 
Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Markov 
analysis or other analytical reliability tools are 
incorporated in this module in order to specify the 
system reliability and the criticality of the various 
components. 
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Fig. 2: Data collection and processing module 
 
FMECA is an expanded version of the classical Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) tool. It consists of 
a systematic study of the system under consideration. 
The overall aim is to review the system in order to 
provide details on how to identify failures and their 
causes as well as determine the end results of the 
failures occurring. It also makes use of severity and 
probability indices thus creating a risk and criticality 
matrix (Turan et al 2003). In this respect, criticality is 
 3
described as the product of the severity and probability 
indices, that is: 
 
Criticality = Severity x Probability   (1) 
 
On the other hand, FTA employs failure rates, Mean 
Time Between Failures (MTBF) or minimal cut sets to 
evaluate the reliability and availability of the system in 
question. In contrast with FMECA, FTA is a top-down 
approach which provides all the necessary information 
about the likelihood of a failure occurring as well as 
how these failures might take place. The focus of FTA 
is on the specific failures developed in the system. 
Thorough knowledge of the system under consideration 
is needed in order to identify the potential failure events 
and their causes. When employing static gates for the 
formulation of FTs, ‘AND’ as well as ‘OR’ gates are 
used, which are described below at time t: 
 
PANDgate (t) = P(c1) P(c2)… P(cn)   (2) 
and 
PORgate (t) = 1 – [1-P(c1)] [1-P(c2)]… [1-P(cn)] (3) 
 
where: 
PANDgate(t) = probability for the ‘AND’ gate 
PORgate(t) = probability for the ’OR’ gate 
ci…cn = independent basic events 
 
Expanding the classical theory about Static Fault Trees 
(SFTs), the concept of Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs) is 
introduced. DFTs have been used to describe and solve 
problems occurring on complex systems. In the 
maritime area, the application of DFTs has been 
investigated on the pod propulsion system of a Roll On-
Roll Off vessel (Aksu et al 2006). The advantage of 
DFTs compared with the SFTs is that the time-
dependent relations as well as the different sequential 
combinations among the different events can be 
described in a more explicit way thus performing a 
more detailed analysis of the system under 
investigation. 
 
In addition to the FTA described above, a further 
assessment using Importance Measures (IMs) such as 
Birnbaum and Criticality Importance Measures can be 
conducted (Espiritu et al 2007). Birnbaum IM is the rate 
of change in the top gate probability with respect to the 
change in the unavailability of a basic event. Therefore, 
the ranking of events obtained using the Birnbaum IM is 
helpful when selecting which end-event needs to be 
improved. It can be calculated as the difference in the 
probability of the top event of a system given that event 
A occurs minus the probability of the top event given 
that event A did not occur. That is: 
 
I
 i
B(A) = P{X|A} - P{X|~A}               (4) 
 
where:  
IB(A) = Birnbaum importance measure for event A 
A = the event whose importance is being measured 
~A = the event did not occur 
X = the top event. 
 
The Criticality IM estimates the percentage of an event 
being critical to the system (top gate). While the 
Birnbaum IM considers only the conditional probability 
that event A is critical, the Criticality IM also considers 
the overall probability of the top event occurrence due 
to event A. The Criticality IM is defined as: 
 
Iicr(A) = (P{X|A} - P{X|~A}) * P{A}/ P{X}            (5) 
 
where: 
Iicr(A) = Criticality importance measure for event A 
A = the event whose importance is being measured 
~A = the event did not occur 
X = the top event.  
 
The overall reliability of a system can also be 
investigated with the use of Markov analysis. This 
involves the determination of the various states that a 
system can be in (good, failed or in between) and the 
transitions from one state to the other with their failure 
and repair rates. Pil et al (2008) provided a description 
and an application of Markov analysis in the case of the 
reliquefaction plant of boil-off gas onboard an LNG 
carrier. Markov models can be used to determine the 
behaviour of a system when, complex repair policies, 
dependent failures and other sequence dependent events 
occur. In the following section, the above mentioned 
maintenance approach will be shown with the 
demonstration of a case study of a diesel generator (DG) 
system of a motor cruise ship. 
Case study 
In the case study presented herein, the first steps of the 
maintenance approach which include the evaluation of 
the reliability and criticality of the different components 
of the overall system is described. The main 
characteristics of the Diesel Generator system are given 
in Table 1.  
Table 1: DG characteristics 
Total no of DG 4 
Rated kW 2,280 
Total HP 13,216 
Total kW 9,720 
Engine rpm 750 
Cylinder bore 320 mm 
Cylinder stroke 350 mm 
FO consumption 3 tonnes/24 hrs 
 
At first, the data collection activity is presented 
including data from the online recording system of the 
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vessel. More specifically MTBF from different 
components of the DG system are collected from the 
ship operator. The FMECA tool is then used to identify 
the most severe and frequent causes of the overall DG 
system failures. Following step is the creation of a FT 
using static and dynamic gates, which is populated with 
the MTBF mentioned above. In this way, the reliability 
of the overall DG system as well as the reliability of its 
sub-systems is examined. In addition, spare gates are 
introduced in order to observe the effect of extra 
measures taken to improve the operation of the DG. 
Finally, the Birnbaum and Criticality IM are applied so 
as to check the contributing amount of specific 
components to the reliability of the DG.  
 
The DG system under investigation is similar to the one 
described in Lazakis et al (2010), which is shown with 
more details in Fig. 3.  
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Fig. 3: Lay out of the DG system of the diesel-electric 
cruise ship 
It consists of four DGs plus an emergency DG. The four 
DGs are connected through the main switchboard with 
two transformers, one for the 440V and one for the 
220V electrical units. The 440V unit is used to provide 
the main propulsion of the ship through two propulsion 
units: propulsion unit 1 (port) and propulsion unit 2 
(starboard). They also provide for the manoeuvrability 
of the ship with two thruster units aft (unit 1) and 
forward (unit 2). The 220V unit covers all the general 
electrical needs of the ship such as the control panel 
(CP) boards for the bridge, engine room, etc. The 
emergency DG is used for the primary needs of the ship 
in case of an emergency/unexpected event. In Fig. 4, the 
DG is broken down into several sub-systems. These are 
the main body/frame, fuel, air, lube oil as well as system 
of other components. 
 
Initially, the FMECA tool is used in which the 
following features of the DG system are mentioned. 
These are the failure events and their causes, the local 
and global effects taking place, the detection and 
prevention method applied, the severity, frequency and 
criticality values, the repair and unavailability times and 
any additional remarks provided. In this way, the most 
critical components are identified which will provide 
assistance in the preparation of the FT structure that 
follows. In short, these are the engine preheating unit, 
the turbocharger, the fuel system, valves, piping, the 
alarms and the start air system 
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Fig. 4: Boundary condition of the DG system 
When applying the FTA tool, the appropriate static 
and/or dynamic gates that best fit each specific case are 
used. The Reliability Excellence software (Relex edition 
2008) is employed to perform the reliability 
calculations. The FT structure for the DG system as well 
as for its sub-systems is initially created and then, the 
various systems are divided into more detailed 
components/end-events (Figs. 5~7). For example, in the 
case of the main body/frame of the DG, the bottom level 
of analysis includes components such as the valves and 
fuel injectors, the oil mist detectors, the cylinder heads, 
the governor and the turbocharger. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Fault Tree structure of the DG system 
 
Fig. 6: Fault Tree structure of the main body/frame 
sub-system 
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Fig. 7: Fault Tree structure of the air sub-system 
Next step is to populate the FT with numerical values. 
Actual failure data was gathered from the operation of 
all DGs of the ship for a period of 5 years. In the case of 
missing data at the time of the analysis, it was 
conservatively assumed that there were no failures 
regarding the specific item and consequently the MTBF 
of this item is estimated at 43,800 hours, equal to 5 
years-time. In this way, the mean values of the MTBF 
of the different components are used (Table 2). It must 
be noted that failure data include not only actual failures 
but also underperforming or overhauling events. In 
order to examine the reliability of the main system and 
determine the criticality of the various components, the 
average values of the MTBF were used as inputs for the 
FTA. It was also decided to employ actual MTBF 
values for the different components instead of using 
mean industry-related failure rates. This was done so as 
to examine the actual reliability of the specific DG 
system and not to carry out a reliability analysis for a 
generic DG system. 
Table 2: Actual field data showing the mean values of 
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) for 
different components of the DG system 
Components MTBF (hours) 
Main body/frame   
Valves, fuel injector 34,248.0 
Cylinder heads 15,239.5 
Governor 19,093.8 
Turbocharger 34,764.0 
Oil mist detectors 18,022.0 
Fuel system 
Fuel system, valves, piping 15,897.0 
Fuel filter duplex 31,782.0 
Thermostatic valve circuit 38,646.0 
Air system 
Start limiter 41,037.0 
Start air system 34,862.0 
Air cooler & manifold 34,722.0 
Other components 
Engine preheating unit  34,401.0 
Alarms 36,252.0 
Instruments 35,880.0 
Special tools 34,728.0 
Lube oil system 
glacier oil filter 22,618.5 
Filter lube oil (duplex) 41,121.0 
L/O system, valves, piping 43,692.0 
 
After entering the values of MTBF for the end-events of 
the FT, the time-dependent reliability calculations 
(computing time) are set. At this point the 
computational pattern presented in Lazakis et al (2009) 
is followed. The simulation time is set to 43,800 hours 
(or otherwise 5 years-time) representing the main 
maintenance/overhaul interval for the ship. The 
reliability of the various systems is examined in time 
steps/intervals of 2,190 hours which coincide with the 
quarterly maintenance intervals period (seamanship 
practice of 3 months period). In this way one can 
observe the progress of the reliability for all the 
equipment in more practical terms. 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 5 the top event is described as 
‘failure of the DG system’ using an ‘Or’ gate. ‘Transfer’ 
gates are also used for the main body/frame, fuel, air, 
other components and lube oil systems in order to 
obtain a more flexible graphical representation of the FT 
structure. Dynamic ‘Priority And’ gates are employed 
for the fuel and lube oil systems so as to represent the 
time-dependent relationships among the basic events. In 
the case of the main body/frame of the DG, ‘Sequence 
Enforcing’ gate is used to link the basic events of valves 
& fuel injector, oil mist detectors, cylinder heads, 
governor and turbocharger. The ‘Sequence Enforcing’ 
gate denotes that events occur in a specific sequential 
order starting from left to right. In this way a more 
accurate representation of the whole DG system is 
made. 
 
The Birnbaum and Criticality IMs are also used to 
examine the influence of the failure of the end-events on 
the DG system and its sub-systems. The Birnbaum IM 
expresses the probability that a component is critical to 
system failure while the Criticality IM is an extension of 
the previous IM in terms of listing the system 
components according to how much they influence the 
main system. These are shown in the following section 
along with the results of the reliability and criticality 
analysis. 
Results 
In this section, the results of the initial FT analysis are 
shown together with the reliability importance measures 
of the FT. Then, the results of the FTs for the second 
scenario including the dynamic ‘Spare’ gates are 
demonstrated along with a comparison between them. In 
this respect, the reliability of the main body/frame, fuel 
and entire DG system is shown first in Fig. 8. As it can 
be seen, the reliability of all three systems is very high 
for a simulation period of 18 months. Especially in the 
case of the main body/frame and fuel systems it remains 
high enough after 30 months of operation (more than 
80%). The reliability of the DG system drops 
significantly after simulation time of 20 months due to 
the fact that the DG system is exclusively related to the 
operation of all the sub-systems (an ‘Or’ gate was used 
to represent the interrelation) which means that failure 
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of the top event occurs if and only if one of the sub-
events fail in the first place. 
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Fig. 8: Reliability of main body/frame and fuel sub-
systems as well as overall DG systems 
Next, the results for the air, other components and lube 
oil sub-systems are presented in Fig. 9 
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Fig. 9: Reliability of air, other components and lube oil 
sub-systems 
As it can be observed, the reliability all three sub-
systems remains quite high (over 80%) for more than 3 
years (38 months) while the other components sub-
system reach 50 months of good operational levels. 
Next, the criticality of the components (events) of the 
DG system was investigated using the Birnbaum and 
Criticality IMs. From Table 3 we may observe that the 
fuel and the lube oil systems are the most critical ones 
according to the Birnbaum IM. ‘Thermostatic valve 
circuit’ (9.94%), ‘fuel filter duplex’ (8.37%) and 
‘valves, piping’ (4.75%) have the higher ranking for this 
measure while ‘L/O system valves and piping’ as well 
as ‘filter, lube oil (duplex)’ follow with 5.94% and 
5.62% respectively. Air system is the next critical sub-
system with ‘start limiter’ (4.77%) and ‘start air’ 
(4.12%) being the less reliable items identified. 
 
For the Criticality IM (Table 4), the ranking of the 
results is similar with those given in Table 3. ‘Valves, 
piping’, ‘fuel filter duplex’ and ‘thermostatic valve 
circuit’ (43.74%), are amongst the highest most critical 
end-items which need to be prioritised for further 
improvement. These are followed by ‘glacier oil filter’; 
filter lube oil duplex’ and ‘L/O system valves and 
piping’ (23.42%). It is also worth mentioning that there 
is a difference among the importance ranking for the 
various end-events for the Criticality and Birnbaum 
IMs. This is due to the different purpose that these two 
measures serve. In the case of the Criticality measure 
the aim is to prioritize the maintenance effort while the 
Birnbaum measure estimates the difference in the 
probability of the top event when the specific event 
measured is in a good operational condition and when it 
is not. 
Table 3: Birnbaum IM for the DG system 
## Event % 
1 Thermo valve circuit 9.941 
2 Fuel filter duplex 8.370 
3 L/O system, valves, piping 5.944 
4 Filter, lube oil (duplex) 5.628 
5 start limiter 4.772 
6 Valves, piping 4.759 
7 Start air system 4.128 
8 Air cooler & manifold 4.113 
9 Glacier oil filter 3.363 
10 Turbocharger 1.337 
11 Valves, fuel injector 1.320 
12 alarms 1.038 
13 Instruments 1.029 
14 special tools 1.000 
15 Eng preheating unit 0.991 
16 Governor 0.810 
17 Oil mist detectors 0.774 
18 Cylinder heads 0.681 
 
Table 4: Criticality IM for the DG system 
## Event % 
1 Valves, piping 43.740 
2 Fuel filter duplex 43.740 
3 Thermo valve circuit 43.740 
4 Glacier oil filter 23.424 
5 Filter, lube oil (duplex) 23.424 
6 L/O system, valves, piping 23.424 
7 Air cooler & manifold 19.897 
8 Start air system 19.897 
9 Start limiter 19.897 
10 Cylinder heads 6.462 
11 Oil mist detectors 6.462 
12 Governor 6.462 
13 Valves, fuel injector 6.462 
14 Turbocharger 6.462 
15 Eng preheating unit 4.834 
16 Special tools 4.834 
17 Instruments 4.834 
18 Alarms 4.834 
 
At this stage, ‘Spare’ dynamic gates are employed in 
order to observe the changes in the reliability and 
availability of the main system and sub-systems when 
introducing a spare event in the FT structure like spare 
components/parts. In this respect, ‘Spare’ gates are used 
for the fuel system and the lube oil system (Fig. 10). 
These two sub-systems were chosen as their end-events 
were amongst the highest ranking of the IMs presenting 
the worst results in terms of their criticality index.  
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Fig. 10: FT structure of the fuel sub-system including 
‘Spare’ gates 
The change/improvement in the reliability results of the 
overall DG system as well as of the fuel and lube oil 
sub-systems is shown in Figs. 11~13. 
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Fig. 11: Comparison of the reliability of DG system 
before and after the introduction of spare gates 
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Fig. 12:  Comparison of the reliability of fuel system 
before and after the introduction of spare gates 
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Fig.: 13: Comparison of the reliability of lube oil system 
before and after the introduction of spare gates 
As can clearly be seen from the figures above, in all 
three cases the reliability index is improved. The fuel 
sub-system presents the most significant change with 
more than 80% reliability after 60 months of operation. 
The reliability of the lube oil sub-system has also been 
improved by more than one third (from 60% to almost 
80% after 60 months of simulated operation). The 
reliability of the DG system was also improved with the 
introduction of spare gates although this is of a smaller 
percentile (from 60% up to 80%) after 30 months of 
operation. At this point, it should be mentioned that the 
increase in the reliability of the DG system is not as 
high as expected. This is due to the fact that there are 
other failure reasons for causing the deterioration of the 
DG and which are not always obvious after the initial 
repair and introduction of spare parts. 
 
With regards to the specific components of the DG 
system that were identified as critical, several measures 
can be introduced in order to improve the reliability and 
overall performance of the system. The ’thermostatic 
valve circuit’ can be inspected and monitored more 
frequently in order to allow for on-time prevention of its 
failure. For the ‘valves, piping’ of the fuel system, 
minor leakages can be located at gaskets and ‘O’ rings. 
These can be rectified by initially carrying out a 
frequent inspection plan and moreover by replacing the 
faulty item with a new one on time. In the case of the 
‘fuel filter duplex’, weekly maintenance is needed 
according to the manufacturer’s instructions. Another 
essential part is the good operational condition of the 
fuel purification system as well as maintaining the fuel 
oil temperature in the right levels during transfer to the 
fuel pumps/injectors. The fuel oil purifiers need to be 
set up accordingly regarding the rate, gravity disc and 
operating temperature. The ‘glacier oil filter’ and the 
‘filter, lube oil (duplex)’ need to be monitored closely 
and cleaned/replaced when appropriate. Also, additional 
measures may include the analysis of lube oil at more 
frequent intervals either onshore or by the onboard 
engineers checking for Total Base Number (TBN), 
water contamination and viscosity so as to prevent 
further anomalies occurring in conjunction with setting 
up the lube oil temperature during purification. 
Concluding remarks 
In the present research paper, a criticality and reliability 
approach is proposed as part of a predictive 
maintenance strategy regarding shipping industry. The 
reliability analysis tools of FMECA as well as FTA with 
static and dynamic gates are used. In addition, the 
Birnbaum and Criticality IMs are employed to 
determine the importance ranking of the components of 
the system examined, which in this case, concerns the 
DG system of a motor cruise vessel. Maintenance data 
are collected for the various components of the DG 
system under consideration. The initial classification of 
all the components of the DG system is performed by 
using the FMECA tool and by involving experts’ 
judgement in the analysis. Furthermore, when FTs are 
applied for the DG and its sub-systems (main 
body/frame, fuel, air, other components and lube oil), 
the overall reliability is calculated. By identifying the 
underperforming components, additional measures can 
be taken to improve their condition. This is achieved by 
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introducing dynamic ‘Spare’ gates which reflect the 
mitigation steps involved regarding the technical part of 
the maintenance procedures. 
 
In addition to the above, other reliability tools (i.e. 
Markov analysis) can be used to simulate the dynamic 
behaviour of the entire DG system and provide its 
reliability results under certain operational assumptions 
(good and failed operational states). Finally, a 
supplementary improvement measure can be the 
introduction of KPIs for the measurement of the 
performance of specific ship systems as well as 
company procedures. 
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